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MORI: Freedom in the Public Sphere and Democracy - What Ties Them Together? 
FREEDOM IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND 




This article examines the role of the concept "public sphere" in the the-
oretical framework of constitutional jurisprudence. Through this con-
cept, the modern individualistic constitutional jurisprudence which con-
siders the state and individuals as confrontational entities may be criti-
cized as failing to take into consideration the structure of the state con-
structed by its citizens. This artide will examine such argument by look-
ing at, first, one of the leading Japanese liberalists, Yoichi Higuchi, and 
then Carl Schmitt, who has theoretical influence on Higuchi. Next, the- · 
ories of John Rawls and Yasuo Hasebe will be examined. Rawls· 
attempts to restrict, by "public reason," activities of citizens who partic-
ipate in political decision-making in order to maintain reasonable plu-
ralism. Hasebe, on the other hand, though he shares some views with 
Rawls, suggests that speech in the public space itself should be restricted 
by reason. The author then presents the view that their theories fail to 
represent the political meaning of citizens' freedom correctly. 
Furthermore, the author presents that a free and democratic govern-
ment can be justified by adopting Kant's concept of the "public use of 
reason" and by referring to the theory of Jiirgen Habermas who finds 
the legitimacy of forming a public opinion fu the intersubjective reason 
that functions in the free discussion in the public sphere. Finally, the 
author argues that this insight supports the view that democratic gover-
nance requires time, and justifies the theory of the chilling effect advo-
cated in the discussion of freedom of expression. 
KEY WORDS • Carl Schmitt • John Rawls • Jiirgen Habermas • public sphere • 
democracy • public reason • public use of reason 
1. Constitutional Jurisprudence and "Offentlichkeit (Public Sphere)" 
The concept of Offentlichkeit (public sphere) is somehow foreign to tradi-
tional constitutional jurisprudence. Before discussing about this unique con-
cept, we must first consider whether the concept actually needs to be intro-
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duced into constitutional jurisprudence. It was many decades ago when 
"The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Strukturwandel der 
Offentlichkeit)" by Habermas first drew people's attention. At that time, 
constitutional jurisprudence did not have a need for the introduction of 
such a concept into its area of study. The reason why the term "sphere" 
properly represents the German word "Qffentlichkeit" is that 
"Qffentlichkeit" refers to, on the one hand, a space in which the general 
public, as distinguished from the state power, engages in discussion, and on 
the other hand, a space in which the general. public engages in discussion, 
but does not act as private economic people. This realm is sometimes 
described as being "non-state and non-economic." The use of this concept 
might have a positive meaning because political activities in this public 
sphere have the potential to change political and economic orders that have 
been systematized. t 
In recent years, various views regarding the public sphere have been pre-
sented by scholars throughout the world. In discussion of theories of 
democracy in general, this concept may already be an issue that "no one 
can avoid talking about." However, this is not the case in constitutional 
jurisprudence. There is a specific reason for the lack of discussion on this 
issue in this area. In constitutional jurisprudence, "public" is a characteris-
tic of state power, and "private" citizens are considered to be entities whose 
rights are protected against the state. How to exercise the right to freedom 
is left to each individual, and the exercise of state power must be restricted 
in light of its public nature. At the same time, this public nature, i.e., "pub-
lic welfare" in the most abstract sense, is used by the state as grounds for 
restricting the freedom of individuals. The meaning of "public" has long 
been a subject of discussion within this theoretical context, sometimes in the 
form of criticisms against its ideology. "Public" was considered a character-
istic of state power, and not a characteristic of freedom. The arbitrary exer-
cise of its power is not permitted because the state is public in nature. 
Therefore, traditional constitutional jurisprudence is cautious about widen-
ing the definition of "public" beyond state power, as typically seen in the 
discussion of the public nature of political parties.2 It must be noted that 
there is a danger that any discussion using the ·concept of the public sphere 
might lead to an acceptance of the state's control, based on the notion that 
what is public should not be completely free. Given this risk, the global 
popularity of the concept is not sufficient to introduce it into the field of 
constitutional jurisprudence. In order to do so, it is necessary to further 
1 In japan, the term "Kokyo-ken (public sphere)" became widely accepted as a trans-
lation of the term "0ffentlichkeit" by the use of the term by Tatsuro Hanada. Tatsuro 
Hanada, Kokyo-ken to iu Na no Shakai-kukan [The Social Space Called Public Sphere] 
(1996). 
2 See Hidenori Mota, Gendai Seito-kokka no Kiki to Saisei [The Crisis and Renewal 
of the Modern Party-State] (1996); Hiroyuki Kamiwaki, Seito-kokka-ron to Kenpo-gaku 
[Theories of the Party-State and Constitutional Jurisprudence] (1999); Hideki Mori, 
"Nihonnkoku-kenpo to Seito [The Constitution of japan and Political Parties]"~ 
Ne.119:l, 50 (1990). 
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clarify the p町poseof this new concept. 
50 far， constitutional jurisprudence has considered democracy without 
the concept of the public sphere. The freedom tQ conduct political' activities 
has been recognized as an essential condition for the legitimacy of demo-
cratic governance. The starting point of the' governing mechanism is， how-
ever， election， bywhich public opinions are systematically presented. In this 
manner， the freedom to conduct political activities and elections (the right 
to freedom and the right to vote) are theoretically severed. Although the 
exercise of the right to freedom of each individual is assumed prior to an 
election， the public opinion that legitimizes state governance is presented at 
the election. This theory is similar to the “majoritarian conception of 
democracy" named and criticized by Ronald Dworken.3 Theories that sever 
human rights from government organizations are likely based on this con-
cept. The “semi-representation (la democratie semi-representative)" theory 
also assumes the existence of “public opinions" by which members of par-
liament are factually bound. Because of this assumption， public opinions 
have legitimate power to bind members of parliament. In light of the princi-. 
ple of democracy， the argument that state power should not be legitimized 
by itself has been successfully presented in constitutional jurisprudence 
without the concept of public sphere. In other words， traditional theories of 
human rights and government organizations have successfully presented a 
systematic theoretical structure without the concept. 
Wby， then， is it necessary to introduce the public sphere theory into con-
stitutional jurisprudence now? Koji Aikyo recently expressed. the view that 
non-existence of the public sphere theory in constitutional jurisprudence 
should be criticized， particularly by criticizing a famous constitutionalliber-
alist scholar， Yoichi Higuchi. Hi思lchiargues that the sovereign authority of 
the state and individual human rights have emerged as two conflicting ele-
ments of the modern state. Although the order of the modern sUlte contains 
a therefore inherent tension， the fact that “individual" freedom has been 
recognized here is important. We should assume the possibility of“creating 
a 'res publica' based on each individual's independence and autonomy."4 
However， according to Aikyo， Higuchi's theory of “bipolar confrontation 
between the state and individuals" has “almost no room to accept the pro-
cess' by which individuals become ‘citizens' by forming public opinions 
through dialogues with others."5 Aikyo's criticism is that without consider-
ing the place in which citizens can exchange their opinions， Higuchi's“res 
publica" by free individuals will be impossible to realize. As Aikyo criti-
cizes， this issue is even more problematic because Higuchi's theory leans 
towards agreement with Carl 5chmitt. In fact， 5chmitt advocated in his 
book “Constitutional Theory (Verfassungslehre)，" a theory that clearly sev-
3 Ronald Dworkin， Sovereign Virtue 356・367(2000). 
4 Y oichi Higuchi， Kindai Kokumin-kokka no Kenpo・kozo[The Constitutional 
Structure of the Modern Nation-States] 90 (1994). 
S Koji Aikyo，“Liberalism Kenpo・gakuni okeru‘Kokyo' ['Public' in ConstItutional 
Liberalism]" Hideki Mori (ed.)， Shimin-teki Kokyo・kenKeisei no Kanosei [The 
Possibility of Formation of a Civil Public Sphere] 58， 72 (2003). 
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ers the pO目ionof the constitution with political nature from its rule of law. 
If Higuchi's constitutional theory presupposes this severance， yet aims to 
reconnect the two， the possibility of successful reconnection will depend on 
whether and how Schmitt's theory can be conquered.6 . 
2. Carl Schmitt's Theory as組 Exampleof“Sever組 ce"
Schmitt is another leading scholar who used the term“Offentlichkeit 
(public sphere)，" giving a very specific meaning to it. According to Schmitt， 
citizens who take responsibility for democratic governance“only exist in 
the public sphere (Offentlichkeit)." However， the meaning of “public 
sphere，" as used by Schmitt，お significant1y'different from that assumed by 
current advocates of public sphere theories. Schmitt used the phrase to 
mean the way citizens， as“political beings，" act to publicly gather and 
cheer by“simply raising their voices." This place where people gather and 
cheer is not a place for the exchange of opinions. For Carl Schmitt，“citi-
zens are not able to discuss. "7 In contrast， basic rights that are the primary 
elements of the rule of law in the constitution are the pre-sta臼 rightsof iso-
lated individuals; and are therefore absolutely protected， atleast in princi-
ple. If the freedom of expression or freedom of association is exercised in a 
political way， however， this absolute protection will be withdrawn. Such 
activities will be subject to restriction as“irresponsible social' forces" that 
might bring confusion to the identity of the nation.8 
It is well known that Schmitt viewed the parliamentary system from a lib-
eral perspective rather than a democratic one. According to Schmitt， irpar・ぜ
liament“true discussion can be made as far as the parliament represen白 the
cultural accomplishment and reason of the nation， and is a collection of .the 
entire intelligence of people. "9 Members of parliament must remain inde-
pendent of ou白ideinfluence and possess dignity. Truth is found through 
their free discussion. At the same time， freedom of exp民ssionis also consid-
ered an element of the parliamentary system because liberalism requires 
such freedom. However， this freedom outside of the parliament has no 
political meaning. Schmitt's position is well explained in his statement that 
“the public nature of opinion (Offentlichkeit der Meinung) is more impor-
tant than the public opinion (凸ffentlicheMeinung). "10 The “public nature 
of opinionてcontainsa concept con町aryto the concept of secret politics. 
6 The au出orsh紅白viewswi出HidekiMoto who suggests that“discussions in ]apan 
lack attention to the theories about the aporia that 'priva目，existence crea旬5a‘public = 
universal' thing." Hidenori Moto， “Gendai Shihon-shugi-kokka to ‘Sh加in・目kiKokyo・
ken' [The Modern Capitalist S同旬andthe ‘Civil Public Spherぜ]"Shiminteki Kokyo・ken
Ke;se; no Kanosei [The Poss;bility of Formation of a Ci・vilPublic Sphere] 103， 109. It 
might be criticized that the author's view crea民5too much tension. 
7 Carl Schmitt， Verfassungslehre 243f.， 315 (1928). 
8 Id. at 163・166，247.
9 Id. at 315. 
10 Carl Schmitt， Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus 47 
(1926). 
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Liberalists believe in the restraint of power through transparency， and to 
discover truth through parliamentary discussions， the parliament must be 
open. Although activities ou回idethe parliamen~ are necessary to ensure its 
openness， this is the only role such activities can play. The place to 
exchange opinions is， inany respect， the parliament. 
This theory of Schmitt's is based on his strong sense of vigilance against 
the risk of the exercise of freedom becoming political. For Schmitt， who 
attempted to stop the collapse of the Weimar Republic by the monopolistic 
decision-making of the state， free political activities were considered to be. 
something that would jeopardize the political stability of the nation. For 
Schr凶民出eemergence of media that had great political influence upon peo・
ple also meant the collapse of his mythical parliamentary system and the 
end of the liberalist era. The principally priva館 natureof the freedoms of 
expression and association became no longer practical. Any sta白白紙can-
not ignore the basis of its existence is forced to take counter measures 
against restrictions imposed by influential media on i白 capacityto make i岱
own decisions.ll Schmitt's view that such activities are“social" instead of 
“public" represents his view that -rhe concept of the public sphere 
(Offentlichkeit) refuses to recognize that free political activities are 
“凸ffentlich(public)." PoHtical activities are， for Schmitt， an explosion of 
partial interests that are detrimental to the sense of identity of nation. The 
public (offentlich) nature is limited to the “citizens who cheer，" individuals 
separated from political activities that gather together only with a sense of 
substantial identity. 
Schmitt's sense of vigilanee against the exercise of freedom becoming 
political may have been an overreaction due to the German situation of his 
time. However， changing the interpretation of the exercise of freedom from 
“social" to “public" is not an easy task. Free political activities are always 
partisan， and unless political activities are partisan， they cannot be called 
fre. If this is so， then why are political activities public? In what sense can 
we recognize the public nature of political activities? Free speech is made 
randomly at various occasions， and thus it appears natural to believe that 
the exercise of freedom of speech becomes public only at an election， where 
anonymous individuals with voting rights gather together (even if not to 
cheer.) 
3. Public Nature by “Public Reason" 
One of the ways to solve this problem is to limit speech containing politi-
cal meaning to ensure its public nature. John Rawls initialy appears to sup-
po目 thisview when he wrote“Political Liberalism." As is widely known， 
Rawls' politicalliberalism suggests that even in a society with incompatible 
yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines， his liberal principle of justice can 
be supported as an overlapping consensus if it is limited to a“political con-
11 Sclu凶t，supra note 7， at165-168. 
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ception" of justice， and not as a competing comprehensive doctrine. Such 
political justice is able to maintain a stable and just society. Being reason-
able means believing in the truths of one's own world view， yet accepting 
others with differing views as free and equal citizens. It also means being 
ready to coopera白 withothers in a fair manner. This view presupposes citi-
zens with “two types of commitments and attachments -political and non-
political. "12 
The' primary criticism against Rawls' view has been that his concept of 
justice is fixed at the stage of i岱 originalposition， and litle consideration is 
given to the process of democracy. Rawls de凶essuch criticism and argues 
that even under his theories， citizens are able to continuously discuss politi-
cal justice and improve their society.“A just regime is a project， as
Habermas says."13 However， discussions regarding politically important 
issues will be restricted in light of political justice. This is so-called “public 
reason." For Rawls， on the “constitutional essentials" and “questions of 
basic justice，" rationales that can be reasonably accepted by al citizens 
should be presented. Although a comprehensive doctrine can be used as 
grounds for the ar，思lmentof one's specific public reason， such a comprehen-
sive doctrine itself is not allowed to be used as a rationale. This is， Rawls 
says， the“4uty of civility" for the maintenance of fair social cooperation.14 
However， is出isdemand not a violation of guarantee of the freedom of 
expression出atis itself part of political justice? It is important to no旬 that
the issue to be addressed here is not about “militant democracy" (the idea 
that no仕eeactivities-should be allowed for any political force that does not 
accept the basic free and democratic order of the society). What “public 
reason" requires is that no comprehensive worldviews， even if they are 
assumed reasonable， should be presented in important political discussions. 
Ra wls himself accep臼 thatthis“duty of civility" will conflict with freedom 
of expression. Therefore， heemphasizes that such duty is a moral duty， not 
a legal dUty.15 This defense stil does not eliminate the following question: is 
requiring a citizen， even one who supports constitutional democracy， tonot 
express his rationale for his beHef compatible with the purpose of guaran-
teeing仕eedomo{ expression? Michael J. Sandel questions this conflict. He 
criticizes Rawls: if an individual cannot express the reason she thinks 
important， the cost of the doctrine she supports will become too high， 
which will not lead to the constr¥1ction of a stable political body.16 
However， the place Rawls assumes“public reason" works is not a place 
where freedom of expression is completely guaranteed.“In a dentocratic 
society， public reason is that of equal citizens who， asa collective body; 
~xercise final political and coercive power over one another in enac白19laws
and amending their constitution." In other words， public reason is required 
to justify the exercise of coercive power. It is町uethat Rawls' argument is 
12 John Rawls， Politi，ω1 Liberalism 31 (1993， paperback ed. 1996). 
13 Id. at 402. 
14 Id. at 213-217. 
1S John Rawls， The Law of Peoples 136 (1999). 
16 Michael Sandel，“Political Liberalism" 107 Harv.L.Rev. 1765， 1789・94(1994). 
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somewhat ambiguous on this point. He primarily assumes a situation where 
citizens are required to exhibit public reason to be an election in which 
important issues are to be determined. At the s~me time， Rawls' arguments 
can be interpreted as broadly restricting citizens' political activities.17 
Charles Larmore also points out this ambiguity: it is not clear whether pub-
lic reason is required for “every kind of political deliberation" or for “delib-
erations which form part of the 0伍cialprocess for arriving at binding deci-
sions." Sandel's criticism against Rawls is based on the former of the above 
two interpretations， but Larmore sugges臼 thatthis is not the only possible 
interpretation of Rawls. Larmore sugges岱 thatthe idea that citizens should 
not know what others are really thinking about is not ideal， but in inter-
preting Rawls， the latter view should be adopted.18 It appears from Rawls' 
statement“public reason sees the office of citizen with its duty of civility as 
analogous to that of judge with its duty of deciding cases， "出at出enarrow-
er interpretation should be supported.19 
A more fundamental problem is;however， that this narrow interpretation 
is based on a narrow interpretation of the political role of citizens. In other 
words， Rawls sees citizens involved in political activities as officials who 
exercise state power. The reason why Rawls was ambiguous on the point 
raised by Larmore is that Rawls considered citizens， from the beginning， to
be those who exercise state power， and found the me.aning of political 
deliberations only in preparation for their own binding decision-making. 
Because citizens have this power， it is justified to require them to restrain 
themselves. The only area in which Rawls allows citizens to use non-public 
reason is the'“background culture，" that is，“social culture， not political 
culture." Rawls then suggests that the “public sphere". advocated by 
Habermas refers to this “background culture." Therefore， for Rawls， citi-
zens are allowed to act in the public sphere (background culture) without 
being imposed any duty of civility.20 
However， the theory of the “public sphere" advocated by Habermas and 
others obviously contains political meanings. The fact that Rawls failed to 
adopt this vecy obvious political nature of the “public sphere" in his theo・
ries proves that his theories failed to include situations where the public 
nature emerges from citizens' discussion. The distinction between political 
17 Rawls， supra note 12， at214・219.
18 Charles Larmore，“Public Reason" Samuel Freeman (ed.)， The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls 368， 380・384(2003). 
19 Rawls， supra note 15， at168. Shojiro Sakaguchi also points out this distinction. 
Shojiro Sakaguchi，“Liberalism to Togi・minshusei[Liberalism and Deliberative 
Democracy]" 65 Koho Kenkyu 116， 122・123(2003). Kent Greenawalt states that the 
imposition of duties on citizens by regarding them as“oficials" of the state who exercise 
coercive power creates a tense' relation with the acceptance of right to secret vote. Kent 
Greenawalt， Private Consciences and Public Reasons 111・113(1995). When realizing 
Rawls' theory as a whole， atan election concerning important political isues， citizens are 
bound by public reason internally in addition to the external reasoning which they are 
not forced to express. Public reason wil conflict wi出freedomof thought as well as fre-
dom of expression. 
20 Rawls， supra note 12， at14， 382 (note 13). 
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and non-political by Rawls is a distinction between the state power， which 
must be restricted， and the private realm， where private doctrines can be 
freely expressed. This view supposes only two types of political discussions: 
private discussions that are free but should not have any political influence 
and public discussions in preparation for binding decision-making that can 
be restricted， if I!ecessary. 1n fact， Rawls' 'theories do not contain any terms 
on the concept of spaces such as the public sphere and public space. This is 
because， for Rawls， the public nature was basically considered an attribute 
of public power. 
In contrast， a japanese scholar， Yasuo Hasebe， who constructs his own 
theories with the influence of Rawls' politicalliberalism， appears to under-
stand the concept of the public space more broadly. Hasebe suggests that 
discussions in the public space should be limited to those regarding “com-
mon benefits of society." Hasebe considers the people's ability to suppoロ
both comprehensive worldviews and political justice to be“schizophre凶c，"
and suggests that the liberal democracy it supports is an“artificial system 
supported by unnatural choices. "21 Although the construction of his theory 
is similar to Rawls， their difference must be clearly noted. For Rawls， plu-
ralism of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is a natural phenomenon of 
free society. Rawls' theories are based on this assumption. Therefore， as
long as political justice is an overlapping consensus， astable society can be 
maintained.22 Rawls also thinks that ordinary “reasonable" people have the 
ability to use the two kinds of commitments because he assumes that， ~ith 
regard to important political issues， ordinary people would think exercising 
state power based on certain comprehensive doctrines and suppressing 
other comprehensive doctrines is unreasonable， even if they believe in the 
truth of their own doctrines.23 Here again， the duty of the self-restraint is 
required to restrict state power. 1n contrast， if Hasebe's arg山nentis inter-
preted such that participation in public discussion itself should occur in 
light of the common benefits of society independent of the concept of pri-
vate goods， then he is requiring individuals to have “strong personalities，" 
much stronger than that required by Rawls.24 This is probably why Hasebe 
must emphasize the artificial and unnatural nature of liberal democracy. 
This theory raises even more serious doubt than Rawls' theories regard-
ing its compatibility with guaranteeing freedom of expression. Hasebe 
argues that public space premises the guarantee of the freedom of expres-
sion. However， ifdiscussions in the public space are so limited， then the 
“freedom" of expression he ass山nesappears to be quite different from the 
general interpretation of “freedom" of expression. Hasebe suggests no 
21 Yasuo Hasebe， Kenpo・.gakuno Frontier [Front，ier of Constitutional Jurisprudence] 3， 
7 (1999); Hasebe， Hikaku-funo na Kachi no Meiro [The Labyrinth of lncommensurable 
Values] 60 (2000). 
22 Rawls， supra note 12， at xvi， 36.Tatsuo Inoue criticizes the“conversion" of Rawls 
because Inoue白血ks血isassumption of naturalness is theoretical re住ogresion.T atsuo 
Inoue， Tasha heno Jiyu [Freedom to Others] 17-20， 117・121(1999). 
23 Rawls， supra no陀 12，at 60・61.
24 Hasebe， supra note 21“Frontier" at 14. 
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doubts that the fr~edom to express private speech must be guaranteed in 
order to enrich public space.25 However， according to his theoretical frame-
work， the expression of private speech shoulq be treated separately from 
discussions about political issues. Rawls addresses a similar issue in his 
counter-argument on“public reason." He s回testhat if comprehensive doc-
trines are expressed only as a“declaration" without the at旬mptto con-
vince others， then they will be allowed even in important political discus-
sions. This “declaration" is， for Rawls， useful in helping citizens realize that 
they share incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive docn-ines， and in fos-
tering “civic friendship. "26 It is not clear how “civic friendship" will emerge 
here， beyond confirmation of their absolute differences between unilateral1y 
declaring doctrines. In any event， inthis argument， the insistence of private 
goods by individuals is limited to saying，“some people think this way，" 
and the possibilities of developing discussions by asking “don't you think 
so?" are eliminated. Freedom of speech is only guaranteed provided the 
content of the speech is private. Political influences are not allowed. The 
reasoning of political decision-making for important issues， orspeech itself 
regarding such issues in the case of Hasebe， requires moral duties. This the-
ory is similar to Schmitt's theory in the sense that exercising the right to 
freedom is“social" and not public.27 
In conclusion， Rawls' theories have no room to accept the “public 
sphere." Only without the concept of the public sphere， the stability of soci-
ety where a political concept of justice is supported as an overlapping con-
sensus is ensured. In contrast， Hasebe's theories have room for accepting 
public space. However， ina strict sense， Hasebe's public space is not a place 
to enjoy freedom. In addition， individuals who support a regulated public 
space are required to have strong personalities. 
4. Public Reason is Not Public Use of Reason 
The “public reason" of Rawls explained above is a completely di妊erent
concept from the “public use of reason" advocated by Kant， who influenced 
Rawls in his use of the term“public reason." The “public use of reason" 
supported by Kant in his “What is Enlightenment?" is to express one's 
opinion to the general public，“as a member of the entire comm山首ty"and 
“in his capacity" (Kant also refers to“as a scholar")， not as an 0伍cial.In 
contrast， the “private use of reason" is the speech of sta旬 orchurch 0伍ー
25 Id. at 16・17(Note 6). 
26 Rawls， supra note 15， at155. 
27 The view emphasizing similarities between Schmitt and Rawls focuses on very limit-
ed aspects. For Schmitt， state power exists (or does not exist)， and its legitimacy is not an 
isue to be discussed. Liberalism is a theory to res位ictstate power， which already exists. 
In contrast， forRawls，“politicalliberalism" justifies sta旬 powerby restricting it. Schmitt 
is also often cited in criticism of Rawls'出eoryas ignoring出emeaning of political s位ug-
gle and as being “non-politiα1." See Chan阻1Mouffe， Tbe Return of tbe Political， Ch.7 
(1993). 
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cials to its people， which may be restricted in order to maintain the orderly 
control of the institution. 1t has been pointed out that the terms“private" 
and “public" are used by Kant in an opposite way from their general use. 
According to Kant， the “public use of reason" means that a powerless indi-
vidual expresses his opinion to an unlimited number of people. The free 
“public use of reason" is essential for the enlightenment and autonomy of 
both individuals and political bodies. 1t is important to note that， inreason-
ing this freedom， Kant emphasizes that public use of reason is harmless. 
Public use of reason allows free discussion， and does riot have any adverse 
effects on the authority's order to obey. The point of this concept is that 
although the public use of r~ason is free because it is harmless， it is not 
hopeless. The public use of reason has the potential to gradually change 
people's conceptions and realize social reforms. Therefore， public use of 
reason gains public meaning.28 
Public use of reason is therefore paradoxical -powerless freedom has 
public meaning. Habermas describes:“the moral self understanding of the 
civil public sphere imposes the duty to abstain from methods of political 
coercive power (politische Gewalt) even on those movements from which it 
only gains the political function.η9 His conflicting phrase，“coercion with・
out coercion，" also implies this concept. On the one hand，“the possession 
of coercive power necessarily harms reason's free judgment." On the other 
hand~ “free and public" discussions by“philosophers" =“enlighteners" can 
require state power to respect them.30 By recogn包inga sphere where discus-
sions take place apart from the exercise of coercive power， .it will be accept-
ed in a positive manner that individuals can freely express what they believe 
to be true， and yet the reasonable public opinion will autonomously emerge 
from this sphere of discussion. The positive meaning of“public sphere" 
emerges only when this paradox is accepted. However， ifthe paradox 
remains as a paradox， such concept cannot be accepted. 1s there any logic 
that can explain this? 
Behind Rawls' view， where social stability is realized by an overlapping 
consensus on political justice， there also exists a concept that the rule of 
political power is accepted on a continuous basis only when various com-
prehensive doctrines support political justice in their own ways.31 The rea-
son for this support depends on private free judgment， and such reason 
does not need to be justified for the public in general. Habermas is skeptical 
about this view. He considers this an a町emptto justify the rule with the pri-
281mmanuel Kant，“Beantwortung der Frage: was ist Aufklarung? (1783)" in 
Werkausgabe Bd. XI， 51(Wilhelm Weischedel ed.， Suhrkamp， 1977). For the detailed 
comparison of Kant and Rawls， see Peter' Niesen， Kants Theorie der Redel斤'eiheit205・
220 (2005). 
29jurgen Habermas， Strukturwandel der Offentlicbkeit 185 (1962， newed. 1990). 
30 Immanuel Kant，“Zum ewigen Frieden (1796)"in Werkausgabe Bd. XI， 191， 227f. 
(Wilhelm Weischedel ed.， Suhrkamp， 1977); Kant， "Der Streit der Fakultaten (1798)" in 
Werkausgabe BιXI， 261， 362・364.
31 Rawls， supra note 12， at420， 433. Here again， the “fre political culture" o( 
Habermas's theory is considered equivalent to the “background culture." 
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vate use of reason， and that it is not likely to succeed. Habermas' basic 
opposition to Rawls is expressed in his view that， particularly for important 
political issues， a consensus through the public use of reason， reached by 
allowing individuals to freely express what they believe to be true， is neces-
sary.32 1n opposition， Rawls criticizes Habermas and supports his own view 
that， although Habermas advocates so-called “proceduralism without sub-
stantive restrictions，" his ideal speech situation is， asa device that leads to a 
correct conclusion， ，derived from the idea of substantive justice. 
Furthermore， there is always a risk of coming to a wrong conclusion from 
procedures without public reason， i.e.，“substantive guidelines." 3 
Habermas' response is that his theory is in fact not normless proceduralism， 
but presupposes“practical reason embodied in procedure." By participating 
in public discussion， each individual's argument will be tested from “amore 
comprehensive and intersubjectively shared point of view." Tested through 
discussion， norms that can be generalized will emerge.“Formal characteris-
tics of procedures and conditions of discourse that force participants to 
adopt views for makiog non-partisan judgments have the power to autho-
rize the rule. "34 This rational discussion process which allows the compre-
hensive participation of citizens also allows a sense of “civic friendship" for 
people with various comprehensive doctrines， advocated by Rawls， and 
therefore the sense of “us" of a communal society. 3S 
Unlike the time of Kant， democracy is in progress in modern society. 
However， Kant's para_dox should stil be maintained. As stated earlier， 
Rawls也inksthat democracy is a sys旬munder which al citizens make deci-
sions as“officials." However， this does not reflect reality. As often said 
when criticizing its ideology， democratic governance does not necessarily 
mean that politically important issues are truly determined by al citizens. 
Real freedom should not be restricted based on such an idealized concep-
tion. The point to be emphasized here is， however， that democratic gover-
nance should not， even as an ideal， be understood in such a manner. The 
fact出atcitizens do not have the actual decision-making power has rather a 
positive meaning in terms of their political pa目icipation.When democratic 
governance is considered to be an accumulation of individual decision-mak-
ing by al citizens， each citizen who undertakes such decision-making is出e
entity who exercises state power， and therefore owes responsibilities associ-
ated with such power. Based on the principle of the rule of law， the exercise 
of state power should not be fre. This would lead to the conclusion that 
citizens should also be restricted by public reason. However， the political 
meaning of freedom of citizens cannot be correctly understood from such a 
32 Jurgen Habermas， ">> Vernun耐g<versus持Wahr<<"Die Einbeziehung des Anderen 
95， 105・116(1996). 
3 Rawls， supra note 12， at425・31.
34 Habermas， supra note 32， at119-125. 
3S Jurgen Habermas， Die pos的ationaleKonstellation 112・117(1998). This statement 
does not mean to deny the fact that Rawls and Habermas share many views. For funda-
mental similarities between them， see Thomas McCarthy，“Legitimacy and Diversity" 27 
Rechtstheorie 329 (1996). See also infra no旬 39.
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view. To understand the formation of free will of citizens in a consistent 
manner， the conversion of viewpoint -from subjective to intersubjective 
reason -must take place. Rational will can only emerge from free discus-
sion among people who have no power. When we think that the reason that 
creates public will functions in the intersubjective communication process， it 
becomes useful and necessary to understand the space where such reason 
functions as the “public sphere." When we recognize that freedom of politi-
cal activities is not limited to the expression of the opinions of each isolated 
individual， but that it instead contributes to the formation of public opin-
ions through a町emptsto convince others， it becomes important for demo-
cratic governance.to ensure that intersubjective reason functions in the dis-
cussion process without being twisted. The important issue is not the 
requirements of each individual citizen， but the way to maintain a free pub-
lic sphere. Hasebe does not realize the powerlessness of each political 
speech， which allows its freedom， aswell as the power of the freedom of 
speech in general， which authorizes the democratic rule via public opinions. 
Furthermore， decision-making through citizen voting can have legitimate 
democratic meaning as a legally-approved means of reflecting public opin-
ions if such public opinions are formed in the public sphere. The voting 
itself does not have meaning in the formation of democratic opinions. 
As to出equestion of whether the “public sphere" should be singular or 
plural， the view that assurnes the singular “public sphere" is sometimes crit-
-icized: under such a view， reason is assurned to be universal and functions 
in a repressive manner for those who do not have the power to present their 
opinions. However， assurning the public sphere is universal does not neces-
sarily deny the truth supported by出eminority. When reason is procedural-
ized， differences between us will be accepted and even promoted.“The uni-
fication of reason is出esource of the diversity of its parts." 36 As far as the 
intersubjectivity of the public sphere remains， we can accept various opin-
ions as public opinions that can claim their general validity. On the other 
hand， opinions presented to members of a closed institution are not eligible 
to claim validity based on the public use of reason. Those who argue that 
public spheres should be plural also recognize that they contain normative 
contents and can be maintained in connection with .the general public 
sphere.37 The demand of groups to be recognized in the public sphere can 
be achieved only when such demand is voluntarily supported by each indi-
vidual member initiating an open discussion on“what is politically rele-
vant" for their identity.38 
36 Jurgen Habermas，“Die Einheit der Vernunft in der Vielfalt ihrer Stimmen" 
Nacbmetapbysiscb回 Denken153， 180 (1988). 
37 Aikyo， supra note 5， at74. See also Masao Higurashi，“Taiko・tekiKokyo・kenno 
Keisei no Tameni [For Formation of a Coun~er-Public Sphere]" Yuibutsu-ron Kenkyu 
Kyokai (ed.)， Aratana Kokyosei wo Motomete [Seeking a New Public Nature} 91， 101・
107 (2000). 
38 Jurgen Habermas，“Kampf um Anerkennung im demokratischen Rechtsstaat" Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen 237， 242・260(1996). 
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5. Suggestions to Constitutional }urisprudence 
Habermas suggested once， by using the expression“partisanship for rea-
son，" that either a目emptingto construct a society. by communicative rea-
son， ordenying such a concept， is a partisan choice. This does not mean the 
denial of reasoning of such a choice in a practical manner. Rather， such rea-
soning is re'quired.39 Whether the concept of the public sphere needs to be 
introduced into constitutional jurisprudence also appears to be the question 
of partisan choice. The author prefers to make a positive choice. In the 
author's opinion， intuitive views of free formation of public opinion 
through freedom of expression and its internal relation with democracy can 
be explained most appropriately by adopting the concept of reason in the 
public sphere. Freedom of political activities is free but not private. Public 
opinions created through public discussion based on such political activities 
have legitimate political power that can influence democratic governance. 
The exercise of right to freedom does not aim directly to seize state power， 
and for this very reason， leads to governance of the sta旬 by“us." By con-
ceptualizing the public sphere between the state and private citizens， the 
reconnection of these two elements of the modern state can be properly 
understood. 
For this view to contribute to relevant discussion in constitutional 
jurisprudence， the author examined in his Minshusei no Kihan Riron [A 
Normative Theoη of DemocracyJ how to understand and respond to the 
distortion of communication in the public sphere (i.e.， the problem of 
accepting freedom of existing social interests to the maximum extent). The 
author also examined the appropriate way to make the state power more 
sensitive to the communicative power arising therein.40 It will be probably 
easier to discuss these issues if we focus on出econcept of the public sphere， 
but doing so will not easily lead to a specific conclusion. 
Instead of delving into the details on these issues discussed in出ebook， 
39 Jurgen Habermas， Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus 194-196 (1973). 
Yasuyuki Funaba presents a similar view regarding the debate between Rawls and 
Habermas and points out that Habermas does not justify the Discourse Principle entirely. 
Its factual acceptance appears to be assumed as in the case of Rawls'“reasonable plural-
ism." Yasuyuki Funaba，“Habermas to Rawls [Habermas and Rawls]" Akira Nagai and 
Masao Higurashi (ed.)， Hihanteki Shakai-riron no Genzai [Current Situation of Critical 
Social Theories] 111 (2003). However， the communicative reason was originally insisted 
to be a“partisan commitment to the ‘reason in history.'" Takeharu Nagai，“Jurgen 
Habermas no Seiji-riron [The Political Theory of Jurgen Habermas]" Nenpo Seiji-gaku 
133 (2002). One of the characteristics of his血eoryis the insistence of the normativity 
that is surely contained but not completely developed in the modern era (“山rtinished
modern") instead of transcendental justification. This creates inevitable tension between 
facts and theories. It might be true that recent views of Habermas tend to lack this記n-
sion， and to出atextent， Habermas is getting closer to Rawls. 
40 Toru Mori， Minshusei no Kihan Riron [A Normative Theoηof DemocracyJ (2002). 
See also Toru Mori，“Die staatliche Willensbildung in der differenzierten gesellschaft，" 
86 ArめかがrRechts・undSozialphilosophie (ARSP) 185 (2000); Mori，“Plurality in 
‘Acting in Concert'" 89 ARSP 538 (2003). 
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some other relevant points should be addressed here. The first point is: even 
though it is likely intuitively known by many， the fact that realization of 
democracy takes time can be theoretically explained through the concept of 
the public sphere. Not al decision-making is democratic just because free-
dom of expression is recognized prior to the decision-making. A“public 
opinjon" on a certain issue that will have the authority to influence relevant 
politics cannot be created unless opinions are freely exchanged and dis-
cussed in the public sphere. It takes time for comparative merits and demer-
its of certain public .opinions to emerge.41 Those who oppose this view 
would insist that勺leterogeneityof various language games cannot be con-
quered by proceduralization，" and that the above view is an indication of a 
“hope of left wing intellectuals... who think出atdelaying decision-making 
on the grounds of rational discussion is itself the success. "42 On the con-
trary， the reason why delaying decision-matcing should be thought meaning-
ful is that if a public opinion goes through su伍cientdiscussion in the public 
sphere， such public opinion is assumed to be tested from non-partisan 
points of view and can legitimately support democratic decision-making. 
Needless to say， there is no yardstick to measure whether su伍cientdiscus-
sions have been made. There might be cases whe~e a bil1 must be forced 
through the parliament. Ho:wever， it appears出atthe c1assic theory of rep-
resentation faHed to construct a theory to restrict such forcible passage that 
is in fact always possible by the governing party. Since sea回 ofthe parlia-
ment are definitely distributed to each political party， regardle~s of whether 
any discussion takes place in the parliament， the outcome is likely to be the 
same. Similarly， asfar as definite supporting bodies and supporting interests 
are assumed to exist in the background of such political pa目ies，出eout-
come wil1 be the same regardless of the existence of discussion. In contrast 
to this view， ifthe relationship in and outside the parliament is viewed in 
light of communication， the parliament is required to be sensitive to the 
process qf discussions in the public sphere which needs time. The normative 
theory of democracy should not take the existence of people's will for 
granted. 
The second point is that the concept of the public sphere might prove the 
importance of eliminating the “chil1ing effect"出athas been discussed in 
relation to the theory of freedom of expression. The也eoryof the chil1ing 
effect is， ingeneral terms， that in order to eliminate risks of deterring 
expression which is intrinsically permitted (chilling eHect)， even expression 
that could intrinsically be restricted shou1d be allowed.43 Although this the-
41 Jurgen Habermas， Faktizitat und Geltung 438 (1992). This means that where demo-
cratic decision-making is necessary and possible by the political power， superiority or 
inferiority of public opinions as a result of discussion should have influence on such deci-
sion-making. As stated earlier， even after going through discussion， minority opinions are 
not“wrong. 
42 Karl Heinz Ladeur， Postmoderne Rechtstheorie 57 (1992). 
43 See e.g. Frederick Schauer，“Fear， Risk and the First Amendment" 58 B.U.L.Rev. 
685 (1978); Richard H. Fallon，“Making Sense of Overbreadth" 100 Yale L.J. 853 
(1991). Attention to the chiling efect plays an important role in the decisions of the 
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ory of the chilling e妊'ectis frequently referred to in the discussion of the 
freedom of expression doctrine， the author is not sure that it has been theo・
retically justified enotigh. There is in fact a criticism against this theory that 
even if freedom of expression is essential for democracy， it could lead to the 
conclusion that protecting freedom that should be protected is sufficient for 
the guarantee of the human right， and the choice to speak should be left to 
each individual based on her own risk calculation. The view supporting a 
wider protection of freedom of expression in order to eliminate the chilling 
effect does not deriye from the idea that the expression of individual opin-
ion is the exercise of freedom of isolated individuals. However， inthe 
author's opinion， by recognizing that expressing one's opinion is part of 
free discussion in the public sphere and出atpublic opinions can be formed 
only through people actively providing subjects of discussion， one can con-
clude that risks taken by people in expressing their opinions should be gen-
erally reduced. In other words， under this view， the introduction of issues to 
be discussed in the public sphere itself has a public nature which ought to 
be special1y protected. In relation to this point， it is important to note that 
Yasuo Hasebe suggests that special consideration should be given to the 
wide acceptance of“expression that contributes to public inte~ests" in light 
of “securing血espace for free expression as a public goOd."44 In Hasebe's 
theory， however， there might be a danger出atrequirements for “contribut-
ing to the public interest" could include substantial restraint. With regard 
to this point， the author rather agrees with Shigenori Matsui's view that 
“the process of democracy will not be ensured" unless freedom of expres-
sion is “protected to an 'unreasonably wide' extent. "45 Freedom of expres-
sion serves the public good， not because each individual expression presents 
~public reason." It serves the public good because it is essential to introduce 
propositions that can be generalized through discussion'. Therefore， the 
public good of freedom of expression should be accepted only when inter-
subjective reason in the public sphere is assumed. 
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